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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
result of a preconception tort. The trend probably will be toward recogni-
tion of such a cause of action. This follows from the similarity between this
type of action and the traditional prenatal injury action which is widely
recognized. However, in view of the potential undesirable situations and
problems that could result from this tort, there is also a clear need for a
limitation on the cause of action. Judicial restrictions, because they are
often unpredictable, would be inadequate for this purpose. A statutory
restraint should be preferred over a judicial limitation in order to enhance
predictability and consistency. A decision of this sort also is more appro-
priately made by the elected representatives of the people. In view of the
probable trend toward recognition of this cause of action, state legislatures
would be wise to consider enacting a statutory limitation on this cause of
action which limits recovery both as to potential defendants and potential
plaintiffs.
VIK ED STOLL
RENTAL HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY
AS A TAX EXEMPT CHARITY AND
RETENTION OF THE NO PARTIAL
EXEMPTION RULE
Franciscan Tertiary Province of
Missouri, Inc. v. State Tax Commission'
Franciscan Tertiary Province of Missouri, Inc., a nonprofit corpora-
tion, owned and operated the Chariton Apartments for elderly and handi-
capped people. The apartments were constructed under an agreement
entered into between Franciscan and the federal government2 whereby the
Department of Housing and Urban Development made interest reduction
1. 566 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
2. The agreement was entered into pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1701r (1970),
also known as the Senior Citizen Housing Act of 1962. The congressional purpose
explicitly stated in the Act was:
The Congress finds that there is a large and growing need for suit-
able housing for older people both in urban and rural areas. Our older
citizens face special problems in meeting their housing needs because of
the prevalence of modest and limited incomes among the elderly, their
difficulty in obtaining liberal long-term home mortgage credit, and
their need for housing planned and designed to include features neces-
sary to the safety and convenience of the occupants in a suitable neigh-
borhood environment. Congress further finds that the present programs
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payments on behalf of the corporation.3 Additionally, substantial sums of
money and personal services were contributed by various charitable
organizations. 4 The only revenues of the corporation came from the ten-
ants' rental payments, which were fixed below cost. 5 In 1973 Franciscan
received notification of ad valorem property tax assessment by the Board
of Equalization of the City of St. Louis. Seeking a charitable exemption,
Franciscan appealed to the Missouri State Tax Commission. The Commis-
sion denied the claim for the exemption. Franciscan brought an appeal
under the Administrative Review Act 6 to the Circuit Court of the City of
St. Louis. The Circuit Court determined that the property was not ex-
empt, but reversed and remanded the decision of the Commission on the
ground that the assessed valuation was excessive. On appeal the Missouri
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the property was operated "for pur-
poses purely charitable" within the meaning of the exemption statute and
therefore was entitled to exemption from ad valorem property taxes. 7
The exemption statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. section 137.100(5)," has been
the subject of frequent litigation since the time of its enactment. Lack of
narrow legislative guidelines and vaguely stated principles of public policy
for housing the elderly under the Department of Housing and Urban
Development have proven the value of Federal credit assistance in this
field and at the same time demonstrated the urgent need for an ex-
panded and more comprehensive effort to meet our responsibilities to
our senior citizens.
3. Interest reduction payments were made pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1715z- 1
(1970).
4. Initial Brief for Appellant at 11.
5. Franciscan administered through the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) a rent subsidy program available to persons whose
monthly income was less than four times their monthly rental. To be self-suffi-
cient from rental income alone, Franciscan would have to charge $268 and $326
for, respectively, efficiency and one-bedroom apartments. In fact, tenants paid
only $105 and $126 respectively.
6. RSMo § 536.140 (1969).
7. See generally Stimson, The Exemption of Propertyfrom Taxation in the
United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411 (1934); Newcomer, The Growth of Prop-
erty Tax Exemptions, 6 NAT'L TAxJ. 116 (1953).
8. Also known as the "charitable exemption statute." The statute in force
during the tax year in dispute, RSMo § 137.100(6) (1969), was reenacted as
§ 137.100(5), Mo. Laws 1974, at 761, § 1 (effective Jan. 1, 1975). Section
137.100(5) exempts from taxation, inter alia, "[A]II property, real and personal,
actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and col-
leges, or for purposes purely charitable and not held for private or corporate pro-
fits ... "
Section 137.100 was enacted pursuant to the discretion granted to the legis-
lature to authorize tax exemptions by Mo. CONST. art. X, § 6, which provides in
part: "all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and
used exclusively for religious worship, for schools and colleges, for purposes
purely charitable, or for agricultural and horticultural societies may be exempted
from taxation by general law." 2
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have resulted in a multitude of cases with apparent factual similarities but
differing results. 9 Some decisions emphasize the nature of the institutions
claiming exemption from ad valorem property taxes; others primarily
have looked to the use made of the property owned by those institutions.10
More specifically, the debate has centered on discordant interpretations of
the words "used exclusively ... for purposes purely charitable";" it hast,
resulted in different requirements for granting a tax exemption under
such language. Franciscan is significant because it provides a uniform in-
terpretation of section 137.100(5) by establishing criteria to be considered
by all claimants under this statutory provision.
In construing tax exemption statutes courts traditionally applied a rule
of strict construction against a party claiming the exemption. 12 The theory
ran that since the sovereign may tax all entities, taxation should be the
general rule and exemption the exception.' 3 This theory, however, has
undergone considerable erosion. Courts often pay only lip service to the
dogma of strict construction. The Missouri Supreme Court's opinion in
Missouri United Methodist Retirement Homes v. State Tax Commission 4
provides a recent example:
It has long been the rule "that exemption statutes are strictly
but reasonably . . . construed. . . ." However, Missouri has
9. See cases cited notes 26-28 infra.
10. Compare Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 354 Mo. 107, 188 S.W.2d 826 (En
Banc 1945) with Defenders' Townhouse, Inc. v. Kansas City, 441 S.W.2d 365
(Mo. 1969). Recent cases seem to draw a clear distinction, however. See Bethesda
Gen. Hosp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 396 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1965) (the charitable use
exemption depends upon the use made of the property and not solely upon the
stated purposes of an organization); Frisco Employes' Hosp. Ass'n v. State Tax
Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1964) (charitable use exemption from ad valorem
taxes depends upon actual use made of property and the stated objectives of the
corporate organization are not controlling).
11. See note 8 supia.
12. St. John's Mercy Hosp. v. Leachman, 552 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. En Banc
1977) (charitable exemption denied to hospital building in which 56% of space
was leased to private practitioners); Farm & Home Sav. Ass'n v. Spradling, 538
S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1976) (savings and loan association not exempt from compen-
sating sales and use tax law); City of St. Louis v. State Tax Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d
839 (Mo. En Banc 1975) (charitable exemption granted to building owned by
engineers' club); Iron County v. State Tax Comm'n, 437 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. En
Banc 1968) (leasehold interest in city property held to be taxable real property
and not immune under exemption for property owned by a city and used for
state, county or local purposes).
13. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837
(Mo. En Banc 1977); Community Mem. Hosp. v. City of Moberly, 422 S.W.2d
290 (Mo. 1967); Bethesda Gen. Hosp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 396 S.W.2d 631
(Mo. 1965); Midwest Bible & Missionary Inst. v. Sestric, 364 Mo. 167, 260
S.W.2d 25 (1953).
14. 522 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Mo. 1975). See also YMCA v. Baumann, 344 Mo.
898, 902, 130 S.W.2d 499, 501 (En Banc 1939).
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declared as its public policy that property actually and regularly
used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from tax-
ation, and the taxing authorities are not to be permitted to defeat
that announced public policy by unreasonable or unrealistic ap-
plication of the "strict construction" rule.
Courts in jurisdictions with similar statutory provisions have rejected the
rule of strict construction; they apply a rule of construction which they
believe recognizes the intent of the legislatures in enacting tax exemption
statutes.15 In these jurisdictions, the legislatures' intent to encourage
charity normally prevails over blind application of the strict construction
rule generally applicable to tax statutes. 16
Although older and stricter views considered charity solely relief of the
destitute,17 a more encompassing approach has been accepted today.
Under this approach, institutions which confer a benefit upon "an indefi-
nite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence
of education or religion, [or] by relieving their bodies from disease, suffer-
ing, or constraint.. ."18 are considered charitable. 19 A parallel view is that
those institutions which save the government expenditures by preempting
necessary governmental action also should be deemed charitable. 20 More
15. E.g., Sunday School Bd. v. Evans, 192 Tenn. 495, 241 S.W.2d 543(1951); City of Richmond v. United Givers Fund, 205 Va. 432, 137 S.E.2d 876
(1964).
16. But see Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 172
A.2d 420 (1961); Commonwealth v. 2101 Coop Inc., 408 Pa. 24, 183 A.2d 325(1962); Appeal of Univ. of Pittsburgh, 407 Pa. 416, 180 A.2d 760 (1962).
17. State ex rel. St. Louis YMCA v. Gehner, 320 Mo. 1172, 11 S.W.2d 30
(En Banc 1928).
18. The full text of this definition of charity is found in In re Rahn's Estate,
316 Mo. 492, 511, 291 S.W. 120, 128 (1926), where the court quoted with ap-
proval from 5 RULING CASE LAW, Charities §§ 2, 3 (1914), as follows:
Probably the most comprehensive and carefully drawn definition of a
charity that has ever been formulated is that it is a gift, to be applied con-
sistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons, either by bringing their hearts under the influence of education
or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or con-
straint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens
of government .... A charity may restrict its admissions to a class of
humanity, and still be public; it may be for the blind, the mute, those
suffering under special diseases, for the aged, for infants, for women, for
men, for different callings or trades by which humanity earns its bread,
and as long as the classification is determined by some distinction which
involuntarily affects or may affect any of the whole people, although
only a small number may be directly benefited, it is public ....
19. Exemptions should be granted where it would encourage a humanitar-
ian activity even if the state would not have provided the service itself. 566 S.W.2d
at 226.
20. Also known as the quid pro quo theory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 373, Comment a (1959). See Note, Taxation: Charitable Institutions:
1979] 157
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germane to Franciscan, however, is the fact that the general concept of
relief of the aged has long been held to be charitable. 21 The English
Statute of Charitable Uses22 begins its citation of charitable purposes with
relief of the aged, illustrating the antiquity of this concept. 23
The Missouri courts have nonetheless applied different requirements
for granting a tax exemption to homes for the aged than for other cate-
gories of charitable exemptions arising under section 137.100(5).24 This
inconsistency has appeared most frequently when the courts have focused
on the nature of the owner rather than on the use of the property. A trilogy
of YMCA cases demonstrates this incongruity. 25 In the first of these cases,
Effect of tax exemption in defining a charity, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 170, 171 (1938);
Note, Taxation-Exemptions- Corporation Furnishing Hospitalization to
Subscribers Held Not Under Charitable Exemption of Social Security Act, 55
HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1942); Note, Tax Exemption of Charitable Property,
80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 724 (1932).
21. The expansive view of charitable purpose taken by many courts is illus-
trated by the following decisions, granting exemptions to homes for the aged:
Fredericka Home for the Aged v. San Diego County, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 221 P.2d 68
(1950); Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. App. 2d 2, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 242 (1961); City of Winter Park v. Presbyterian Homes for the Synod, 242
So. 2d 733 (Fla. App. 1970); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Methodist Home for
the Aged, 241 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. App. 1968); South Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v.
Board of Rev., 173 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1970); Bozeman Deaconess Found. v.
Ford, 151 Mont. 143, 439 P.2d 915 (1968); Glass v. Oklahoma Methodist Home
for the Aged, Inc., 502 P.2d 1268 (Okla. 1972); In re Tax Appeals of United
Presbyterian Homes, 428 Pa. 145, 236 A.2d 776 (1968); Milwaukee Protestant
Home for the Aged v. City of Milwaukee, 41 Wis. 2d 284, 164 N.W.2d 289
(1969). But see the following decisions denying exemptions for charitable pur-
poses to homes for the aged: United Presbyterian Ass'n v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 167 Colo. 485, 448 P.2d 967 (1968); Methodist Old Peoples Home v.
Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149, 233 N.E.2d 537 (1968); Lutheran Home, Inc. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 211 Kan. 270, 505 P.2d 1118 (1973); Madonna Towers v. Com-
missioner of Tax., 283 Minn. 111, 167 N.W.2d 712 (1969); Westminster Geron-
tology Found. v. State Tax Comm'n, 522 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1975); Paraclete
Manor v. State Tax Comm'n, 447 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1969); Defenders' Town-
house, Inc. v. Kansas City, 441 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1969); County of Douglas v.
OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 172 Neb. 696, 111 N.W.2d 719 (1961); Presbyterian
Homes v. Division of Tax Appeals, 55 NJ. 275, 261 A.2d 143 (1970); Friendsview
Manor v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Or. 94, 420 P.2d 77 (1966), aff'dper curiam on
rehearing, 427 P.2d 417 (1967).
22. 43 Eliz. I, c.4 (1601).
23. The Statute of Charitable Uses was repealed by the Mortmain and
Charitable Uses Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c.42, but the preamble was specifically
retained by § 13(2) of that act as a definition of charitable purposes.
24. Westminster Gerontology Found. v. State Tax Comm'n, 522 S.W.2d
754 (Mo. 1975); Paraclete Manor v. State Tax Comm'n, 447 S.W.2d 311 (Mo.
1969); Defenders' Townhouse, Inc. v. Kansas City, 441 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1969).
25. A fourth YMCA case frequently cited with the cases indicated in the text
is State ex rel. Koeln v. St. Louis YMCA, 259 Mo. 233, 168 S.W. 589 (1914) (ex-
emption denied). It is distinguishable in that portions of the ground floor of the 5
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State ex rel. St. Louis YMCA v. Gehner,26 the court upheld the assessment
of three pieces of real estate. The decision was based upon the presence of
a cafeteria and other facilities which were open to members and non-
members at commercial prices. Similarly, in St. Louis YMCA v. Gehner27
the exemption was denied; the only variation from the facts of the previous
case was that use of the facilities was limited solely to members. Both deci-
sions placed substantial emphasis upon the character of the persons actu-
ally served by the facilities and upon service charges sufficient to defray the
costs incurred. In contrast, the court in YMCA v. Sestric28 upheld as ex-
empt the same residence halls determined to be taxable in the earlier
cases. The court focused on the use of the property. It determined that the
operation of facilities for board and lodging was intimately related to a
charitable purpose, not carried on for the purpose of making a profit. It
seems apparent that the distinctions among these cases lie not in the facts
but in the principle of law applied by the courts. The court in the third
YMCA case applied the proper legal principles, guided by the reasoning of
Salvation Army v. Hoehn.29 Salvation Army is the seminal case regarding
what property is to be exempt from ad valorem taxation under the
Missouri charitable exemption statute. The case involved a claim for ex-
emption of a thirteen story building in which young women were housed.
Charges for rooms and meals were substantially less than those levied at
commercial establishments in the area. In addition, needy and deserving
applicants were subsidized by a reduction in the regular rental rates. The
court rejected the assessor's contention that the mere receipt of payment
from occupants of an institution suffices to preclude it from charitable ex-
emption status.3 0 Overruling the first two YMCA cases, the supreme court
held that the charitable exemption provision had been construed too nar-
rowly in those cases. 31 While the cost to residents was more than nominal,
the furnishing of humanitarian services at cost or less was deemed a suffi-
cient basis for granting exempt status.
The reasoning of Salvation Army was utilized extensively in granting
charitable exemptions to hospitals.3 2 At the same time, though, no at-
tempt was made to apply this interpretation to exemption claims by homes
two buildings involved were rented to others for use as commercial stores. See
note 49 infra.
26. 320 Mo. 1172, 11 S.W.2d 30 (1928).
27. 329 Mo. 1007, 47 S.W.2d 776 (En Banc 1932).
28. 362 Mo. 551, 242 S.W.2d 497 (En Banc 1951).
29. 354 Mo. 107, 188 S.W.2d 826 (En Banc 1945).
30. See cases collected in Annot., 34 A.L.R. 364, 638 (1925); Annot., 62
A.L.R. 328, 330 (1929); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 284, 286 (1937). See also Westmin-
ster Gerontology Found. v. State Tax Comm'n, 522 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1975) (not-
for-profit operation to provide housing for the elderly does not lose its charitable
nature because residents are charged for facilities they receive).
31. 354 Mo. at 114, 188 S.W.2d at 830.
32. Jackson County v. State Tax Comm'n, 521 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. En Banc
1975); Community Mem. Hosp. v. City of Moberly, 422 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1967);
1979]
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for the aged. 33 Instead, courts consistently tested such claims by reference
to inconsistent pre-Salvation Army cases.3 4 This regressive approach can
be traced to Defenders' Townhouse, Inc. v. Kansas City.35 The court there
undertook a review of prior Missouri cases, but failed to adopt the stand-
ard enunciated in Salvation Army. Instead, it focused on the economic
aspects of the operation, not for the purpose of determining whether the
operation was not-for-profit, but as a substitute for concen-
trating on whether the property was used for a charitable purpose. With-
out explaining why the tests of Salvation Army and YMCA v. Sestric were
inadequate, the court examined and applied the treatment given similar
claims by courts in other jurisdictions. 36 This resort to inquiry into other
jurisdictions is indicative of a view that homes for the aged are in some way
so different from other exemption claimants as to warrant special treat-
ment.
The court in Franciscan made it clear that Defenders' Townhouse con-
stituted a departure from prevailing principles in its interpretation of sec-
tion 137.100(5).7 Although the latter case was not expressly overruled, the
court in Franciscan stated that in the future tax assessors and the Commis-
sion should not look to and follow Defenders' Townhouse and its progeny.
The court held that "the words 'used exclusively ... for purposes purely
charitable' . . . should and do have the same meaning whether applied to
property used for a hospital,3 8 for training handicapped workers, 39 for
operating a YMCA type of program4 or for providing housing for the ag-
ed. 4 1 It clarified and reemphasized the mandate set forth in Salvation Ar-
Bethesda Gen. Hosp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 396 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1965); State ex
rel. Alexian Bros. Hosp. v. Powers, 10 Mo. App. 263 (St. L.), aff'd, 74 Mo. 476
(1881).
33. See cases cited note 24 supra.
34. See cases cited note 24 supra.
35. 441 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1969).
36. The court, however, did not discuss or reconcile the variations in the
statutory or constitutional provisions construed in the cases examined from other
jurisdictions.
37. 566 S.W.2d at 223.
38. See cases cited note 32 supra.
39. Missouri Goodwill Indus. v. Gruner, 357 Mo. 647, 210 S.W.2d 38
(1948).
40. See cases cited notes 26-28supra. See generally Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1453
(1932) (exemption from taxation of the property of a YMCA or YWCA). Cf.
Jewish Community Centers Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 520 S.W.2d 23 (Mo.
1975) (youth summer camp).
41. 566 S.W.2d at 223-24 (footnotes added). See note 21 supra. See also
Note, Tax Exemption of the Property ofEducational Institutions, 6 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 342, 344 (1938); Note, Real Estate Taxation of Fraternities and Faculty
Houses, 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (1963); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1064 (1951)
(property used by personnel as living quarters or for recreational purposes as
within contemplation of tax exemptions extended to property of religious, educa-
tional, charitable, or hospital institutions); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 904 (1959) (ex-
emption from taxation for college fraternity or sorority houses).
160 [Vol. 44
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my: that the focus of the exemption should be on the use of the property
and not on the nature of the owning institution. 42
The notable significance of Franciscan is that it expanded on the
Salvation Army decision by establishing three prerequisites for property to
be exempt as charitable under section 137.100(5). The first and most
quantifiable prerequisite is that the property be owned and operated on a
not-for-profit basis. 43 This proviso typically has been strictly construed;
44
however, it does not mean that the organization must operate on a break-
even or deficit basis. 45 In essence it simply means that any profit derived
from an organization's operations must be achieved incidentally to the
primary goal of the organization. 46 Furthermore, any profit so achieved
must be devoted to furtherance of the charitable objectives of the organi-
zation. 47
The unmistakable emphasis is that the property be operated purpose-
fully not-for-profit. If the property is used for the primary purpose of pro-
ducing income, the exemption will be forfeited4 8 even though all profits
derived were later devoted to charitable purposes. 49 The policy underlying
42. See also YMCA v. Sestric, 362 Mo. 551, 559, 242 S.W.2d 497, 502 (En
Banc 1951); Missouri United Methodist Retirement Homes v. State Tax
Comm'n, 522 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1975).
43. 566 S.W.2d at 224.
44. RSMo § 137.100(5) (1969) states in part, "the exemption herein granted
does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the
organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals
received therefrom is used wholly for religious, educational or charitable pur-
poses ....
45. See, e.g., Community Mem. Hosp. v. City of Moberly, 422 S.W.2d 290,
296 (Mo. 1967), where the court in discussing income from pay patients stated:
Such considerations as whether a profit or loss was in fact realized or sus-
tained, or that some competition with private business exists, or that pay
patients are admitted for treatment, or that a large part of its revenue is
derived from pay patients, are not determinative if, from the evidence, it
may be fairly said that the actual use made of the corporation's property
is consistent with the nonprofit features and charitable purposes ex-
pressed in the corporation's articles of agreement.
46. Franciscan's stated purpose is "to provide for elderly or handicapped
persons on a non-profit rental basis housing and related facilities and services
designed to meet the physical, social and psychological needs of the aged or
handicapped and contribute to their health, security, happiness and usefulness in
longer living." Initial Brief for Appellant at 5.
47. See Community Mem. Hosp. v. City of Moberly, 422 S.W.2d 290, 294
(Mo. 1967), where the court stated: "all such margin of income over expenses in
each year has been expended on improvement of building, facilities, equipment,
services, and retirement of debts." But see authorities cited note 49 infra.
48. See Note, 4 U. CIN. L. REV. 249,250 (1930); Note, 11 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 62, 63 (1938).
49. Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Hoehn, 355 Mo. 257, 196 S.W.2d 134
(1946) (exemption denied to a publishing corporation organized as a subsidiary of
the Lutheran Church, even though all profits made by the publishing company
1979]
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this prohibition can be stated quite plainly: a tax exemption granted by
the public should not inure to the benefit of an individual or organization
in such a way as to amount to a return on investment. The courts have not
yet developed a satisfactory answer to the question of how close to commer-
cial rates an organization can charge and still qualify as a charity. It does
appear that a charitable organization cannot support a claim for exemp-
tion to the extent that its charges for services are commensurate with those
of other profit-seeking entities supplying the same service in the commun-
ity.60
The second prerequisite for charitable exemption is that the dominant
use of the property be designed, directly or indirectly, to benefit an indefi-
nite number of people. 5' This prerequisite is easily satisfied when the prop-
erty of the claimant is utilized in such a manner as to relieve the state of a
burden. 52 It is the state which generally assumes care of the indigent and
the helpless. The assumption of these duties by charitable organizations
pro tanto benefits the public.53 Charitable activities which are intended to
improve the physical, mental and moral condition of the recipients not
only make it less likely that the recipients will become burdens on society
but make it more likely that they will become useful citizens. Where no
such public advantage can be shown, the institution, despite the best of
motives, will not qualify as a charity for purposes of tax exemption.14
The final prerequisite for exemption is that the property be used exclu-
sively5 for charitable purposes. Cases employing this factor prior to Fran-
ciscan have not construed it literally. In 1974 a building owned by an
were turned over to the church for use in its religious activities). Cf. Van Alstyne,
Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461, 501 (1959) (indi-
cating a "division of authority, explainable largely in terms of whether judicial
attitudes are directed upon immediate uses or upon ultimate purposes").
50. In its requirement that any excess of income over expense be achieved
incidentally to the dominant charitable objective of the claiming organization,
the Missouri courts have by negative implication indicated that an exemption will
not be granted to such organizations which are in competition with profit-seeking
enterprises. Other jurisdictions have explicitly taken this position. E.g.,
Homewood-Brushton Citizens Renewal Council v. Pittsburgh, 27 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 630, 635, 367 A.2d 405, 408 (1976) (denying exemption for roller-skating rink
operated by non-profit corporation which charged fees roughly comparable to
commercial operations and stating "[w]hen an institution, otherwise charitable,
seeks to compete with private enterprise for the custom of the general public at
commercial rates it cannot qualify for a charitable exemption on the portion of its
holdings so operated").
51. 566 S.W.2d at 224.
52. See note 20 supra.
53. Note, Tax Exemptions of Charitable Property, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 724
(1932).
54. See City of St. Louis v. State Tax Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Mo.
En Banc 1975) ("controlling factor is the extent to which such activity is designed
to benefit the public and society in general").
55. The phrase "used exclusively" refers to the primary and inherent use as
opposed to a mere secondary and incidental use. See St. John's Mercy Hosp. v.
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engineer's club which was used for limited social activities and on occasion
was used by private companies was found to be exempt as a charity from ad
valorem taxes.5 6 Similarly, residential properties owned by a charitable
hospital and occupied by hospital personnel were held to be used exclu-
sively for charitable purposes and hence exempt from taxation.57 The un-
'willingness of the Missouri courts to deny an exemption where there has
been incidental use of the property for nonstatutory purposes is consonant
with the flexible attitude taken by other state courts interpreting the ex-
clusiveness requirement. 8 Moreover, the nonliteralist reading conforms to
the policy underlying the statute of encouraging charitable organizations.
As long as the improper use is de minimis, the charitable organization
should retain its exemption.5 9
The liberal interpretation given section 137.100(5) by the supreme
court in Franciscan supports the observation that Missouri has chosen ex-
emptions as an integral and ever-increasing part of its property tax system.
The prerequisites enumerated above for the granting of an exemption cer-
tainly will decrease the confusion that previously existed. Nevertheless,
some criticism of the existing judicial interpretation of this statute is likely
to continue. Particular criticism presently focuses on the refusal of the
Leachman, 552 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. En Banc 1977); YWCA v. Baumann, 344 Mo.
898, 130 S.W.2d 499 (En Banc 1939). But see Community Mem. Hosp. v. City of
Moberly, 422 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1967); State ex rel. Koeln v. St. Louis YMCA, 259
Mo. 233, 168 S.W. 589 (1914).
56. City of St. Louis v. State Tax Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. En Banc
1975).
57. Bethesda Gen. Hosp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 396 S.W.2d 631 (Mo.
1965).
58. E.g., Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 729,
221 P.2d 31 (1950); People ex rel. Goodman v. University of Ill. Found., 388 Ill.
363, 58 N.E.2d 33 (1944); Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb.
357, 133 N.W.2d 455 (1965); Princeton Twp. v. Tenacre Found., 69 NJ. Super.
559, 174 A.2d 601 (App. Div. 1961); Willamette Univ. v. State Tax Comm'n, 245
Or. 342, 422 P.2d 260 (1966); Multnomah Sch. of the Bible v. Multnomah Coun-
ty, 218 Or. 19, 343 P.2d 893 (1959); Engineers & Scientists of Milwaukee, Inc. v.
Milwaukee, 38 Wis. 2d 550, 157 N.W.2d 572 (1968). But see Teaneck Twp. v.
Lutheran Bible Inst., 20 N.J. 86, 118 A.2d 809 (1955).
59. A fair reading of the few Missouri cases on religious organizations could
reasonably lead one to conclude that the court would be quite tolerant in permit-
ting established churches a wide degree of latitude in using the premises for
secular activities, while at the same time less willing to extend the exemption to
property devoted to philosophical or untraditional forms of activity. One exam-
ple of overreaction to an unpopular religious activity (reported by NBC News on
June 28, 1971) in Kansas City was the threatened loss of property tax exemption of
the United Presbyterian Church because of its contribution to the Angela Davis
legal defense fund. It is difficult to comprehend the rationale behind letting the
contribution itself jeopardize the tax exemption of a church building used pre-
dominantly for religious purposes. But see St. Louis Gospel Center v. Prose, 280
S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1955).
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Missouri courts to accept the partial exemption theory. 60 In some states a
building under single ownership used partly for exempt purposes and
partly for other purposes will be taxed only to the extent used for non-
exempt purposes. 61 Missouri, however, continues to follow the opposing
view, and maintains that the nonexempt use of any portion of the building
renders the entire building taxable. 62
Although the Missouri courts generally have not strictly construed the
"used exclusively" proviso of section 137.100(5),63 they interpreted this
60. Judge Bardgett, in his dissenting opinion in St. John's Mercy Hosp. v.
Leachman, 552 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Mo. En Banc 1977), advocated acceptance of
the partial exemption theory. "In my opinion the rule would not violate any
Missouri constitutional provisions as it would allow the exemption for charitable
purposes and not allow the exemption for premises not so used."
61. At least 32 states currently allow partial exemptions. McKee v. Evans,
490 P.2d 1226 (Alaska 1971); Hanagan v. Rocky Ford Knights, 101 Colo. 545, 75
P.2d 780 (1938); Hartford Hosp. v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 279 A.2d 561
(1971); State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Jones, 150 Fla. 491, 8 So. 2d 17 (1942); Peach-
tree on Peachtree Inn, Inc. v. Camp, 120 Ga. App. 403, 170 S.E.2d 709 (1969);
Illinois Inst. of Tech. v. Skinner, 49 Ill. 2d 59, 273 N.E.2d 371 (1971); Sahara
Grotto and Styx, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 147 Ind. App. 471, 261
N.E.2d 873 (1970); Trustees of Iowa College v. Baillie, 236 Iowa 235, 17 N.W.2d
143 (1945); Louisville v. Board of Trade, 90 Ky. 409, 14 S.W. 408 (1890); Grand
Lodge v. New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 659, 11 So. 148 (1892); Lewiston v. All
Maine Fair Ass'n, 138 Me. 39, 21 A.2d 625 (1941); Frederick County v. Sisters of
Charity, 48 Md. 34 (1877); Assessors of Worcester v. Knights of Columbus
Religious Educ. & Benev. Ass'n, 329 Mass. 532, 109 N.E.2d 447 (1952); Detroit
Young Men's Soc'y v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 172 (1854); Christian Bus. Men's Comm. v.
Minnesota, 228 Minn. 549, 38 N.W.2d 803 (1949); Northwestern Improvement
Co. v. Rosebud County, 129 Mont. 412, 288 P.2d 657 (1955); YMCA v. Douglas
County, 60 Neb. 642, 83 N.W. 924 (1900); Alton Bay Camp Meeting Ass'n v.
Alton, 109 N.H. 44, 242 A.2d 80 (1968); State v. Haight, 35 N.J.L. 178 (1871);
Community-General Hosp. v. Onondaga, 80 Misc. 2d 96, 362 N.Y.S.2d 375
(1974); Piedmont Mem. Hosp. v. Guilford County, 218 N.C. 673, 12 S.E.2d 265
(1940); New Haven Church v. Board of Tax Appeals, 9 Ohio St. 2d 53, 223
N.E.2d 336 (1967); Board of Equalization v. Tulsa Pythian Benev. Ass'n, 195
Okla. 458, 158 P.2d 904 (1945); Hibernian Benev. Soc'y v. Kelly, 28 Or. 173, 42
P. 3 (1895); YMCA v. Reading, 402 Pa. 592, 167 A.2d 469 (1961); De Soto Bank
v. Memphis, 65 Tenn. 415 (1873); Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698, 5
S.W. 519 (1887); Odd Fellows' Bldg. Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 177 P. 214
(1918); Spaulding v. City of Rutland, 110 Vt. 186, 3 A.2d 556 (1939); Wilson's
Modern Business College v. King County, 4 Wash. 2d 636, 104 P.2d 580 (1940);
Columbia Hosp. Ass'n v. Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660, 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967); In-
dependent Order of Odd Fellows v. Scott, 24 Wyo. 544, 163 P. 306 (1917). States
which have rejected partial exemption are: State v. Bridges, 246 Ala. 486, 21 So.
2d 316 (1945); Defenders of the Christian Faith v. Board of County Comm'rs, 219
Kan. 181, 547 P.2d 706 (1976); Wyman v. City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335 (1852);
State ex rel. Hayes v. Board of Equalization, 16 S.D. 219, 92 N.W. 16 (1902).
62. City of St. Louis v. State Tax Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. En Banc
1975); Missouri Goodwill Indus. v. Gruner, 357 Mo. 647, 210 S.W.2d 38 (1948);
Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Hoehn, 355 Mo. 257, 196 S.W.2d 134 (1946);
Wyman v. City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335 (1852).
63. See notes 56 & 57 supra.
[Vol. 44
11
Ballsrud: Ballsrud: Rental Housing for the Elderly As a Tax Exempt Charity
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
RECENT CASES
proviso to preclude exemption of property used concurrently for chari-
table purposes by the owner and for non-charitable purposes by the owner
or some other institution or individual. 64 This apparent inconsistency,
while criticized as being outmoded and unjustified, is not wholly without
merit. Analysis of the few Missouri cases on this subject reveals that the
opposition to partial exemption is rooted in an understandable reluctance
to invade the province of the legislature. 6.
Wyman v. City of St. Louis66 stands as the leading Missouri case advo-
cating rejection of the partial exemption theory. The taxpayer in Wyman
owned a four story building; the top two floors were used as a school, while
the first floor contained stores and the second was used partly for the
school and partly as a concert hall for hire. The owner sought to enjoin the
collection of half the assessed property taxes on the basis that one-half of
the building was used for school purposes. The court commented on the
incongruity which results "when religion and learning are mingled with
trading and trafficking-with fiddling and singing. ' 67 It discussed the in-
herent difficulties in collecting taxes on the nonexempt portion of the
building in case of delinquency, as well as the initial problem of deter-
mining valuation and assessment of that portion. In denying the exemp-
tion the court established a precedent which has been upheld for over 125
years.
A Minnesota decision, Christian Business Men's Committee v. State,68
typifies cases on the other side of the ledger. There the court apportioned a
three story building between the commercial nonexempt first floor uses,
and the exempt charitable uses of the basement, second and third floors.
The court rejected as unsuited to modern times the "assumed arbitrary
rule of thumb that a building is necessarily taxable or nontaxable in its en-
tirety. '69 The Minnesota court dismissed the problems of assessment and
collection which had troubled the Missouri court in Wyman, stating:
Where, as here, we have divisions within the buildings by
floors - or by rooms of a substantial size - there is no insurmount-
able difficulty in effecting an apportionment. Likewise, there is no
insurmountable difficulty in enforcing a collection of the tax. A
substantial and certain fractional part of realty obviously may be
sold for nonpayment of an ad valorem tax, and in the event the
purchaser thereby ultimately acquires a title in fee he may, if
necessary, segregate or sell his interest therein through partition
proceedings. 70
64. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
65. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
66. 17 Mo. 335 (1852).
67. Id. at 337.
68. 228 Minn. 549, 38 N.W.2d 803 (1949).
69. Id. at 558, 38 N.W.2d at 811.
70. Id. at 560, 38 N.W.2d at 811 (footnote omitted).
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While Missouri courts probably would not argue with the conclusion that
such an assessment presents "no insurmountable difficulty," their basis for
disagreement would be simply that section 137.100 does not contemplate
the assessment, nor did the legislature intend it.71
The property referred to by the courts in partial exemption cases has
been a single building under single ownership. It is precisely for this reason
that the Missouri courts would not be so sanguine as was the Minnesota
court regarding the problem of tax collection through the sale of an undi-
vided portion of a building. The Minnesota court suggested that the pur-
chaser of a part of a building could, "if necessary, segregate or sell his
interest therein through partition. ' 72 The result of this course of action
would be a forced sale of the entire building, thus defeating the interests of
the exempt user. A reading of the Missouri cases indicates that since it is a
legislative function to determine how delinquent taxes are to be collected,
including what property or portions thereof are to be sold, if the purchaser
at a tax sale is to be the purchaser of a partition suit, the legislature is the
body to so declare. The court has applied this same rationale in determin-
ing that if partial exemption is to be permitted, it is the legislature's func-
tion to do so.73
To meet the qualifications for charitable exemption from ad valorem
taxation, then, it is incumbent upon the property owner to show clearly
that use of the property satisfies the prerequisites set forth in Franciscan.74
The mere fact that property is held by an institution of public charity is in-
sufficient to meet this burden. 75 An exemption should be granted when
71. South Dakota was succinct in rejecting the apportionment concept. In
State ex rel. Hayes v. Board of Equalization, 16 S.D. 219, 227, 92 N.W. 16, 18
(1902), the court said:
It is held in some jurisdictions that where property is used for different
purposes, or, as in this case, where a part of the building is used for other
than charitable purposes, there may be a due apportionment of values in
the assessment, so as to confine the exemption to so much of the value as
the privileged part represents. We cannot subscribe to this doctrine. It
conflicts with the letter and spirit of our constitution. Any quantity of
real property so situated as to be properly assessed as one tract or parcel,
under one description, should be treated as an entity, all or no part of
which is taxable. (citations omitted).
72. See note 70 supra.
73. In State v. Bridges, 246 Ala. 486, 21 So. 2d 316 (1945), the majority
based its decision to reject partial exemption on the lack of any statutory provi-
sion for collecting delinquent taxes by sale. The court relied heavily on Wyman v.
City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335 (1852) for support of its position.
74. See text accompanying notes 43-59 supra.
75. St. Louis Lodge v. Koeln, 262 Mo. 444, 448, 171 S.W. 329, 330 (1914).
Charity is not a promiscuous mixer. Here she modestly stands outside
or goes her way and waits; waits until the plaintiff has finished using the
spacious and comfortable rooms for the pleasure of its members; waits
until the curtain has fallen upon the last scene of the vaudeville perform-
ance on the stage; until the billiard rooms have been deserted to the
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